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Bulgaria’s wrestlers in Rome 1960, East Germany’s success through drug use at Munich 1972, and 
Poland’s Pole Vaulters in Moscow 1980. Each case exemplifies the complex nature of sports politics, 
showing the connection of each country to the Stalinist model but also their independence from it through 
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Introduction: The Cold War and Sports 
Michael Phelps, Usain Bolt, Larisa Semyonovna Latynina. When these names come to 
mind there is only one event they can be paired with. The Summer Olympics. The Summer 
Olympics, to many, is the premier sporting event in the world. Every four years, millions of 
people around the world gather around televisions or in the stadiums to watch world-class 
athletes participate in events ranging from skeet shooting to basketball to rowing. This being a 
year where the Tokyo Olympics has been postponed due to the Coronavirus pandemic, the 
magnitude of the Olympics is truly being felt in its absence. It would be impossible for the 
Olympics to have the impact it does if it was solely about sports. Despite the best efforts of those 
like Avery Brundage, the Olympics has just as large of an impact in the areas of politics and 
culture as it does in sports. This is particularly noticeable when one looks back to the Olympics 
of the 1950s – 1980s when the politics of the Cold War dominated the games. This paper will 
seek to investigate that time, covering the Summer Olympics that took place in Europe from 
1952, when the Soviet Union first participated in the Summer Olympics, to 1980, when the 
Summer Olympics found its way to Moscow. Using these Olympic Games, an argument can be 
made that the combination of sports and politics at the international level was felt by more than 
just the United States and the Soviet Union. 
  Much of the scholarship on the Olympic Games during this time covers the competition 
between the two main powers of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States. Both 
countries took a broad approach to focus on international sport as a way to engage in symbolic 
warfare. The success of one side and failure of the other would act as subtle propaganda 
promoting their political system. In her book The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports 
Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, Jenifer Parks approaches this conflict from the side of the 
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Soviet Union. She writes that in the Soviet Union, sports were essential to building the new state. 
The role of sports in public health, education, and military preparation made it crucial to building 
a strong Soviet society both before and after WWII. The Olympics were also an important way 
to promote late Stalinism and communism to the rest of the world. Pitting Soviet-style sports 
regimes against the "free" west sports programs allowed the Soviets to overcome many of the 
negative perceptions of communism held by the rest of the world.1 
 On the opposite side is Toby C. Rider’s book Cold War Games: Propaganda, the 
Olympics, and U.S. Foreign Policy, in which he discusses the United States' approach to athletics 
during the Cold War. Rider writes that the Americans were keenly aware of the threat Soviet 
sport showed in its display of Soviet political and ideological strength, and, because of this, they 
engaged in a "Total Conflict" that was fought in the trenches of public opinion. In order to do 
this, the U.S. attempted to fully utilize the medium of the Olympic message for political gain 
through the competition itself, the host cities, and by secretly gaining leverage within the 
Olympic committee itself.2 
 The attempts of these two powers to influence the games they competed in were not lost 
on the games themselves. In his book Rome 1960: The Olympics that Changed the World, David 
Maraniss writes about the political, cultural, and athletic landscape of the Rome Olympics. While 
often overshadowed by games such as the Munich Olympics of ’72 or the Moscow Olympics of 
’80, the Rome Olympics was still a significant affair. Maraniss writes that these games 
represented the dying of the old order and the formation of the new one. These were the first 
Olympic Games to be commercially broadcast, and this brought the athletic propaganda of these 
 
1 Jenifer Parks, The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War: Red Sport, Red Tape (New 
York: Lexington Books, 2016). 
2 Toby C. Rider, Cold War Games: Propaganda, the Olympics, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 2016). 
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countries to an even wider audience. Female athletes also had a much larger role than ever 
before, as did the African countries that competed and represented the burgeoning success of the 
African decolonization movement. The games also took place against the backdrop of an anxious 
period of the Cold War, with the infamous U2 affair and Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to the UN 
General Assembly putting fuel on the political fire.3 
 If the political torch of the Olympic Games was burning bright after Rome, it would 
become an inferno after the Munich Olympics of 1972. In their study, The 1972 Munich 
Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany, Kay Schiller and Christopher Young show how 
these games forged the state of Germany that we know today. The narrative of these Olympics 
could be easily overshadowed by the boycotts of Rhodesia’s inclusion, the opposition to the 
games by the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR), or by the most infamous event 
that occurred, the murder of eleven Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists. Schiller and Young 
attempt to overcome this by telling the story of the Munich from beginning to end. They write 
that beyond the politics of the Cold War, these games were important for how they showed West 
Germany’s successful rehabilitation to the world stage through their attempts to distance 
themselves from the 1936 Berlin Olympics, the so-called “Nazi Olympics.”4 
 David Clay Large’s book Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror, and Triumph At The Olympic 
Games follows a similar path, claiming that the Munich Olympics was the most political of all of 
the modern Olympic Games. He reminds the reader that West Germany’s importance in the Cold 
War was because of its position directly next to communist East Germany and that this resulted 
 
3 David Maraniss, Rome 1960 : The Olympics That Changed the World (New York : Simon & Schuster, 2008), 
accessed March 27, 2020, http://archive.org/details/rome1960olympics00mara. 
4 Kay Schiller, The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany, Weimar and now 42 (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2010). 
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in militant anti-communism in West Germany.5 The most important point that Large makes is 
that in the magnitude of the festivals and the political atmosphere surrounding them, especially 
in the case of the Munich Olympics, it is easy for the athletes to get lost. That is the case for most 
of these Olympic Games. What is also clear is that much of the scholarship on the Olympics 
during the Cold War is very focused on the aims and actions of the two great powers, the United 
States and Russia. This causes the experiences of the athletes of other nations to be 
overshadowed as well. This paper will distance itself from this scholarship is to investigate the 
Olympic involvement of the other nations of the Warsaw Pact in Europe, and to see what cultural 
and political implications their involvement came with. The politics of the Soviet Union's allies 
in Eastern Europe were just as intertwined with their sporting programs as they were for the 
larger powers. Sports allowed these countries to show their allegiance to their socialist allies and 
prove their dominance over capitalism and the west but were also examples of the 
oppressiveness of the Stalinist system and provided an outlet for the discontent of the people 
under the communist regimes. 
 
Helsinki and Hungary: The Golden Team 
 The Helsinki Olympic Games were significant because they were the first true “Cold 
War” Olympics. These games were the first in which the athletes of the Soviet Union would 
compete against the athletes of the United States.6 From this point forward, the games would 
have an inherently political nature. But this was not the only major story to come out of the 1952 
Olympics. If there is a story that defines the experience of the non-Soviet communist countries in 
 
5 David Clay Large, Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror, and Triumph at the Olympic Games (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2012). 
6 Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
2002), 97. 
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Helsinki, it is that of the Hungarian national team and their gold medal-winning soccer team, the 
“Golden Team.” One of the most famous football teams of all time, it was captained by the 
legendary Ferenc Puskás, for whom the Puskás award is named. The team was formed by coach 
Gustav Sebes, who needed to argue with Soviet-influenced Hungarian political authorities for the 
ability to enter a team into the games.7 The team's legend comes from more than just their 
success, they would go on to have a deep impact on how the game of football itself is played. 
The team pioneered the 4-2-4 formation and a unique playstyle, as described by Puskas as "'a 
proto-type of the ‘total football’ played by the Dutch [in the 1970s].’”8 Throughout the six years 
of the team’s existence, including the 1962 Olympics, they had forty-two victories, seven draws, 
and one defeat, which came in 1954 to the West German team in the game that became known as 
“The Miracle at Bern.”  
 While the “Golden Team” exemplified the success of Hungarian international sports, 
especially at the 1952 Olympics, it also exemplified the dark nature of sports under the iron 
curtain. In 1952, Hungary was in the midst of Stalinist rule, characterized by harsh political 
practices and oppression. This would take the form of violent altercations by the Hungarian 
secret police with anyone who seemed to be a threat to the state.9 Despite this, as shown by the 
success of the football team at the Olympics, the Hungarian athletes achieved relative success in 
sports. Yet this success came with a political cost. From 1948-1951, the Hungarian Communist 
Party, the MKP, centralized more than just the economy; it also took firm control of the nation's 
sports teams as well. All the sports clubs in the nation became attached to state-owned industries, 
 
7 “The Legend of the Hungarian Golden Team Was Born at the Helsinki Games in 1952 - Olympic News,” 
International Olympic Committee, last modified April 19, 2020, accessed April 30, 2020, 
https://www.olympic.org/news/the-legend-of-the-hungarian-golden-team-was-born-at-the-helsinki-games-in-1952. 
8 “The Legend of the Hungarian Golden Team.” 
9 Johanna Mellis, “From Defectors to Cooperators: The Impact of 1956 on Athletes, Sport Leaders and Sport Policy 
in Socialist Hungary,” Contemporary European History 29, no. 1 (February 2020): 60–76, 64-65. 
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and both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense placed teams under their 
control, stacking them with the best players in the process.10 This created an atmosphere in 
which the sports teams, and their players, were seen as connected to the communist government 
and essential in its promotion. While their needs were met to ensure that they were successful in 
their athletic endeavors, heavy punishments were used to control their behavior and make them 
into models of the Soviet Man and Woman.11 This created the conditions that made their teams 
so successful but also greatly damaged them, especially in the case of Sándor Szúcs.  
Sándor was a defender on the Hungarian team owned by the Ministry of the Interior and 
was drawn away from Hungary for love and for money. He had planned to escape to West 
Germany with his mistress and also felt that he could earn money playing football in Italy.12 
Defection was the biggest threat to the Hungarian national sports body, and this was primarily 
what the punishments were used to prevent. In 1951, Sándor attempted to purchase the 
documents he needed to defect but unknowingly purchased them from an agent working for the 
Ministry of the Interior. He was caught armed with a pistol on his way to the border. Sándor was 
subsequently tried and despite pleas from Puskás and other members of the Hungarian national 
team, he was sentenced to death.13 This served as a painful lesson to Hungarian athletes and may 
have served to assist in the success of the Golden Team. The team’s most talented players would 
have been too scared to leave the country and be well-paid for their talents, instead choosing to 
not risk death and play for Hungary. Their morale was most definitely shaken as well, yet they 
still were able to find great success. The Hungarian football team at the time of the 1952 
Olympics was an example of the initial strength of the Stalinist system. Hungarian officials saw 
 
10 Mellis, “From Defectors to Cooperators,” 65. 
11 Mellis, “From Defectors to Cooperators,” 65. 
12 Mellis, “From Defectors to Cooperators,” 66. 
13 Mellis, “From Defectors to Cooperators,” 66-67. 
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sports as essential to their foreign policy goals, wanting to use it to promote the ideal Soviet Men 
and Women through physical success. Yet to achieve this they had to resort to violent and 
oppressive tactics, which would lead to the challenges to the Soviet system in Hungary in the 
subsequent 1956 revolution. The painful memories of their lost friends like Sándor had stuck 
with the Hungarian athletes, and at the Melbourne Olympics of that same year they promised 
“that at the Olympic Games we will be fighting in the sacred spirit of the martyrs of the national 
revolution and for the glory of the Hungarian nation.’14  
 
Rome and Bulgaria: The Dive 
 
As mentioned earlier, the 1960 Olympics in Rome were overshadowed by other games in 
popular memory. Besides the success of Wilma Rudolph and these games being the first to be 
televised internationally, the 1960 Olympics lacked notable events. But there is one event that 
flew under the radar in its subtlety that sheds light on the politics of sport in another iron curtain 
country, Bulgaria. In the semifinals of the Men’s Greco-Roman wrestling competition, Bulgarian 
Dimitro Stoyanov and the USSR’s Avtandil Koridze faced off for a chance to wrestle 
Yugoslavia’s Branislav Martinovic in the gold medal match. At the time, the Bulgarians were 
seen as “loyal to the Soviets to the point of athletic obedience.”15 So when faced with the 
possibility of both wrestlers being eliminated if the match was to end in a tie, Stoyanov 
seemingly gave up and allowed Koridze to win. Koridze would subsequently defeat Martinovic 
for the Olympic gold, and many fans and commentators were quick to call foul and blame 
Stoyanov for throwing the match.16 Does this claim hold any weight? 
 
14 Mellis, “From Defectors to Cooperators,” 68. 
15 Maraniss, Rome 1960, 215. 
16 Maraniss, Rome 1960, 215. 
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 Bulgaria had a long history of domination at the hands of Soviet authorities. Following 
World War Two, Bulgaria was quickly swept up in the Stalinization of Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Red Army occupied the nation after its victory over the Germans, and this put it in a 
prime position to force a communist takeover of Bulgaria’s government. Its politicians were 
unjustly tried and either imprisoned or shot.17 The political oppression went so far as to reach the 
founder of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Traicho Kostov, who was tried and executed for 
criticizing a Soviet-Bulgarian economic agreement that was unfavorable towards Bulgaria. Stalin 
did this to show the crimes of “nationalism,” despite the fact that Kostov was a key opponent to 
Yugoslavia, one of Stalin’s main opponents at the time.18  
This connection to the Soviet system would have a direct influence on the Bulgarian 
approach to sports. The Bulgarian government matched its political takeover with one of the 
sports leadership of the country, eliminating the old system and establishing the Supreme 
Committee for Physical Culture and Sport in 1949.19 This lead to a centralization of sports by the 
government, similar to that of Hungary, whereby the number of sports clubs in the country was 
minimized in order to bring full control under the state apparatus.20 This allowed for the 
importance of sport to the Soviet to system to take hold in the country, which was made clear by 
Bulgarian head of state Todor Zhikov in 1963: “‘What kind of builders of socialism and 
communism would people be? What defenders of the country would they be with an undermined 
health? What generations would they create?’”21 As in Hungary, sports were essential to the idea 
 
17 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2006), 132, 137, 175. 
18 Judt, Postwar, 178. 
19 Vassil Girginov, “Totalitarian Sport: Towards an Understanding of Its Logic, Practice and Legacy,” Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions 5, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 25–58, 37. 
20 Girginov, “Totalitarian Sport,” 36. 
21 Girginov, “Totalitarian Sport,” 39. 
 10 
of an ideal communist society. In order to defend the country and its communist system, health 
needed to be a priority of the Bulgarian people.  
Was Stoyanov feeling this pressure? While we may never know what was going on in his 
head, it was certainly possible. Wrestling was one of the six sports imposed by the Bulgarian 
Communist Party in 1958, which was brought down from the eleven imposed in 1949.22 By 
imposing a sport the Communist party put these six sports at the forefront of their goals at the 
time, distributing resources and privileges to the sports that others did not receive. Most 
importantly, Stoyanov could have been in direct contact with Zhikov. During his time as First 
Secretary of Bulgaria, 1954-1988, Zhikov wrote fifty-seven letters to world champion and 
Olympic athletes. The content of these letters revolved around one central idea, that their 
accomplishments were "A sporting victory in the name and for the glory of Bulgaria."23 
Bulgaria's direct communist takeover at the hands of the Red Army, the direct influence of the 
communist government on the sports leadership of the country through the centralization of 
sport, and direct communication from the First Secretary of the Communist Party to athletes 
would all provide reasons for the Bulgarian teams to be "athletically obedient" in their loyalty to 
the Soviets, pushing Stoyanov to feel compelled to throw the match. 
Interestingly enough, the Soviet sports bureaucracy was not feeling confident in their 
communist neighbors at the time. In 1961 a report was prepared by Russian bureaucrats to argue 
that contests between Soviet teams and the teams of other socialists were being used for 
nationalistic purposes. They cited incidents in which Bulgarian athletes, among others, had 
injured their Soviet competitors, and Bulgarian fans had exhibited “hooliganish” behavior in 
 
22 Girginov, “Totalitarian Sport,” 38. 
23 Girginov, “Totalitarian Sport,” 46. 
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their treatment of the Soviet athletes.24 So was Stoyanov’s loss truly an iron curtain submission? 
An argument could be made for both sides. The Bulgarian government was closely connected to 
the Soviet system and its political leaders placed importance on sports, but there was also an air 
of discontent among the Bulgarian athletes and fans. While Stoyanov may have simply tired at 
the end of the match and been defeated fair and square by his opponent, the world, for the first 
time televised internationally, saw what they believed to be a Cold War act of socialist 
oppression. 
 
Munich and the GDR: The Scandal 
  
The Munich Olympics will be forever characterized by the tragic events that unfolded 
during it, but the athletic achievements of these games are stained by much more than blood. The 
Munich Olympics provided a stage for one of the most important conflicts of the Cold War to 
play out: the rivalry between Western Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and 
Eastern Germany, the GDR. The GDR was one of, if not the most important socialist ally of the 
Soviets. The Russians had established a communist regime during their post-war occupation, and 
by the time de-Stalinization was threatening many of their socialist allies, the East Germans had 
become the most loyal and obedient ally of the Russians.25 The importance of this was the 
GDR’s proximity to Western Germany, which was directly connected to the socialist enemies in 
the Western Bloc. Any division within the communist party of the GDR would endanger its 
independence from the West, so great care was taken with their leaders by Russia, and any 
inkling of national independence was crushed.26 
 
24 Parks, The Olympic Games, 53. 
25 Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large, The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2009), 434. 
26 Gilbert and Large, The End of the European Era, 434. 
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 Like the other Eastern Bloc countries, sports were seen as a political weapon for both the 
GDR and the FRG. In its early days of 1949, GDR officials wanted to avoid athletic 
involvement, especially in the Olympics, because they saw it as capitalist exploitation. Their 
minds were changed by the sporting ambitions of their Soviet allies and of their neighbors, 
resulting in their attempts to join the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the governing 
body of the Olympics.27 The opposition to sports had transitioned to willing participation, and 
eventually to obsession when the FRG prevented GDR athletes from competing in either of the 
1952 Olympics. East German officials saw that “Olympic Sport offered a golden opportunity for 
the GDR to challenge the FRG’s peremptory claim to be the only legitimate Germany.”28 Not 
only did sport become the way for the GDR to compete directly with the FRG, but sports became 
a pillar of socialist society there. Athletes became the heroes of the workers’ and peasants’ state, 
and victory was a success for the GDR and its socialist system.29 The only thing that stood in 
their way was the IOC’s goal to avoid politics being involved in the games and have one, unified 
Germany compete. Neither side was a fan of this, and the GDR used Soviet backing to push for 
the ability to compete on its own, winning the right to do so before the 1968 Olympics in 
Mexico.30 This set up the 1972 games in Munich as the absolute perfect time to prove the 
dominance of the Soviet system over the “evil capitalists.”  
 At the end of the games, the East Germans seemed triumphant. They were third in the 
medal count with sixty-six medals, twenty-six more than their West German neighbors. But a 
“grotesque shadow [was] hanging over the competition.”31 Allegations and stories about drug 
 
27 David Clay Large, Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror, and Triumph at the Olympic Games (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 23. 
28 Large, Munich 1972, 24. 
29 Large, Munich 1972, 25. 
30 Guttman, The Olympics, 96. 
31 Large, Munich 1972, 284. 
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use and gender manipulation surrounded the GDR teams. Their reliance on pharmaceutical 
enhancement became clearer over time. The GDR’s major contribution to sports medicine was 
the recent development of an anabolic steroid, and the speculation about their drug use was 
confirmed by testing after the games.32 Yet due to the poor testing of athletes during the games, 
particularly the West German officials’ inability to test for steroids, meant that the stained East 
German performances would stand. What led to the GDR taking such drastic measures? Was the 
direct influence of their Soviet allies so strong that they would throw ethics out the window in 
order to win? In the leadup to the 1972 games, the GDR wanted to strengthen its alliance with 
the other socialists through sports, organizing meetings of the sports leadership of socialist 
countries.33 The East Germans also found common ground through political propaganda before 
the games. But in reality, they were very much on their own: “the prospect of Western currency 
and Olympic capital provided more luster than the GDR’s ideological smear could tarnish.”34 
The West German’s Ostpolik policies had begun to break up the solidarity between the socialist 
states, and the Soviets had been working on treaties with the West Germans in order to enforce 
the subsidiary nature of the GDR. Yet, “In Sport, in contrast to politics, however, it was the 
imperial master who felt exploited by its satellite.”35 Despite the Soviet’s best efforts to enforce 
the GDR’s subsidiary role, the GDR had become a sports powerhouse and a daunting threat to 
the Soviet Union.  
Like the Bulgarians, the East German athletic teams potentially broke ethical barriers in 
order to achieve athletic success: taking a dive to ensure success for the Soviet athletes in the 
case of the Bulgarian wrestlers, and for the East Germans rampant drug use was implemented to 
 
32 Large, Munich 1972, 181-182. 
33 Schiller, The 1972 Munich Olympics, 179. 
34 Schiller, The 1972 Munich Olympics, 179. 
35 Schiller, The 1972 Munich Olympics, 176-177. 
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ensure that their athletes were at the top of their game. It could be argued that the direct influence 
of the Soviet Union due to the importance of East Germany caused this. But in reality, the 
athletics policies of the GDR and its socialist allies were split at the time, with the Soviets and 
other Eastern Bloc states working with West Germany in order to make money through athletics. 
The true cause lies in the intense rivalry between East and West Germany due to their ideological 
differences and political history. The East Germans were driven to abandon their allies and 
devote themselves to beating their neighbors by whatever means necessary. 
 
Moscow and Poland: The Pole Vaulter 
 
Of all the Olympic games that took place in Europe during the Cold War, the Moscow 
1980 Olympics may be most emblematic of the divide between East and West. Upon the 
announcement of Moscow’s selection as the host city there was immediate controversy. The 
Russians were more than pleased with the selection: “The Soviet people, the Communist Party, 
and the Government of the USSR view the Olympic Games as an outstanding event in 
international sporting life, reflecting the striving of peoples for peace, détente, cooperation, and 
mutual understanding.”36 But there would be little room for mutual understanding. Calls for a 
boycott of the games came very quickly, and these calls became shouts upon the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The Americans had already been wary of the games, 
predicting that they would be “a ‘major propaganda festival’ advancing the Soviet cause,” and 
jumped on the opportunity the invasion presented to boycott the games if the Soviets refused to 
remove their troops, urging other countries to join them.37 When his deadline for removal passed, 
United States President Jimmy Carter stayed true to his word and used presidential powers to 
 
36 Alfred Erich Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999), 174. 
37 Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympics Games, 176-177. 
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pressure the United States Olympic Committee into supporting the boycott. Thirty-five other 
countries refused the IOC invitation for the games, and twenty did not respond at all.38 For those 
that did compete at the games, their participation inherently showed their support for the Soviet 
Union. It was impossible for the IOC, or anyone for that matter, to deny the political nature of 
these games.  
 The games themselves went particularly well in the eyes of those that supported them, 
but there was one event that stuck in the mind of spectators. The Moscow Olympics were meant 
to be a display of the dominance of Soviet sport, and their winning medal count proved that it 
was, but the way this dominance was achieved left a sour taste in the mouth of observers. During 
the final of the men’s pole vault competition, it became obvious that the home crowd wanted 
Soviet athlete Konstantin Volkov, who was going up against the Polish favorite Wladyslaw 
Kozakiewicz, to win.39 The Soviet fans tried everything in their power to undermine 
Kozakiewicz during his jumps, whistling, booing, and heckling him during each attempt and 
staying silent during the jumps of his competitor.40 Despite this, the Pole vaulter (Kozakiewicz) 
won the event, setting a new world and Olympic record in the process. Upon his winning jump, 
Kozakiewicz stood up and gave a now-infamous Italian gesture to the entire Russian crowd in 
attendance, who were praised by the very unbiased Eastern European press for their politeness.41  
 Was this an act of political dissidence? Or just competitive in nature? In the politically 
charged atmosphere of the games, both are likely. Poland had a long history in the Eastern Bloc. 
It was one of the countries occupied by the Red Army immediately after World War Two and 
 
38 Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympics Games, 182-183. 
39 “Kozakiewicz Denies Local Hero in Pole Vault - Olympic News,” International Olympic Committee, last 
modified July 21, 2016, accessed May 1, 2020, https://www.olympic.org/news/kozakiewicz-denies-local-hero-in-
pole-vault. 
40 Barukh Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1982),183. 
41 Hazan, Olympic Sports, and Propaganda Games, 183 
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suffered at the hands of Stalinist purges. Despite this, it would go on to become one of the most 
industrialized countries in the Bloc.42 The de-Stalinization period at the end of the 1950s was a 
period of social unrest. Communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, who was removed from power 
by the Stalinists, took over after their ousting yet remained loyal to the Soviet system. He 
continued to emphasize industrialization, and his failures led to the communist government 
retaining its image as an oppressive force in Poland.43 This was evident in their approach to 
sports. In the same 1961 report naming Bulgarian fans as being hostile to Soviet athletes, 
Russian officials claimed that Polish fans threw bottles at the athletes during contests.44 In 1980, 
the year of the Moscow Olympics, the discontent reached another boiling point. Polish workers 
across the country launched non-violent strikes that were successful enough to receive support 
from Pope John Paul II, who was the first Polish Pope.45 Similar to the other individual acts 
made by athletes mentioned in this paper, it is impossible to truly know what Kozakiewicz was 
thinking when he made his gesture. The picture of him smiling and giving his gesture to the 
crowd could have been competitive spirit, it could have been emblematic of the simmering 
discontent of the Polish people, or, as the Polish government reportedly claimed, it could have 
been an involuntary muscle spasm.46 Like the other athletes, regardless of his intent, it is 







42 Gilbert and Large, The End of the European Era, 324. 
43 Gilbert and Large, The End of the European Era, 432. 
44 Parks, The Olympic Games, 53. 
45 Gilbert and Large, The End of the European Era, 520. 




Conclusion: More Than A Game 
 
The issue with using the examples of individual athletes is that their example only 
provides a snapshot and not the full picture of the approach to sport in the countries of the 
Eastern Bloc. But viewed against the context of their international politics and the importance 
each communist government placed on sport, it is obvious that the connection between politics 
and sport was just as strong in the Eastern Bloc countries as it was in the Soviet Union or the 
United States. In Hungary, the centralization of sports programs and oppression of its athletes 
created the conditions in which their soccer culture thrived. In Bulgaria, their athletic obedience 
to the Soviet Union and their own centralization of sports was seemingly tested through a 
potential dive. The East German sports program made an effort to align themselves with other 
socialist countries and was so consumed with its drive to dominate West Germany that they 
threw ethics out the window. With Poland, their athletes experienced the importance of sports 
success to the Russian people.  
But in each case, there is an air of independence. Hungarian athletes attempted to leave 
the country prior to Helsinki and pledged their performances in Melbourne to those involved in 
the Hungarian Revolution. The Bulgarians were not trusted by Russian sports officials because 
of their anti-Soviet fans, casting doubt on the potential of a dive. The Germans were virtually 
independent in their sports efforts from their Soviet allies in Munich. And against the backdrop 
of protests in Poland, Kozakiewicz showed the Russian fans what he thought of their efforts. 
Each case displays the complicated nature of sports and politics in the Eastern Bloc. Sports were 
a way for each country to connect to the Soviet system at the state level, show their superiority to 
the West, and create the ideal Soviet Mand and Woman. But sports also showed the 
independence of the states from the Soviet system both at the individual level through athletes’ 
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attempts to achieve success for reasons separate of the system their country was pledged to. To 
those living under the Iron curtain, sports were more than just games. If it was up to Avery 
Brundage, this wouldn’t be the case, but to those who compete and love their sport, it will always 
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